The Federales that recently conquered Picacho Pass continued marching through the rain, ready to sweep away the revolutionaries. The PLM forces, however, defend the canal bed southwest of town, and wait for the arrival of the Federal forces. Only two bridges cross the canal, and Jiménez’s cavalry squad waits at Little’s Ranch, between the Federal soldiers and the Rio Nuevo, to hit the enemy first.
Set up:
Place a canal or river through the center of the table, running across the length of the table. There are 2 passable bridges over the Rio Nuevo. The east side of the table is the rebel side, with Mexicali behind them (offtable if necessary). On the west half of the table, place desert terrain, with Little’s Ranch close to the canal on the south end. Place two entry markers for the government forces on the western edge of the table - one toward the center, the other toward the north. The defending forces should be placed in the canal bed, except for a small group of advanced defenders on horseback, waiting at Little’s Ranch, and unarmed reinforcements, off table.
Conditions:
Torrential Rain - low visibility
PLM Forces:
Defenders at Rio Nuevo:
HQ: Leyva 9 rebels
Group 1: 25 rebels
Group 2: 25 rebels
Cavalry at Little’s ranch:
Jiménez and 15 riders
Reinforcements: an additional group (Group 3) may enter the table at any spot on the eastern edge to reinforce the rebels. They have no weapons, however, and must take the weapons of fallen comrades or soldiers before firing.
Government forces:
HQ: Colonel Vega and 9 soldiers.
1st Company, 50 soldiers (5 platoons of 10).
2nd Company, 50 soldiers (5 platoons of 10).
3rd Company, 50 soldiers (5 platoons of 10).
4th Company, 50 “Volunteers” (5 platoons of 10).
Rebel Objectives:
-Blow up both bridges
-Take out Vega.
Government Objectives:
-Capture at least 1 bridge intact.
-Punch through rebel defenses and onto Mexicali.
Victory Conditions: PLM must prevent the government forces from opening a corridor to Mexicali, destroying, capturing, or routing the attackers. The government forces must open a corridor to Mexicali and pass a company off the east end of the table.
Aftermath:
This great victory for the PLM led to an influx of recruits, the recovery of over 100 guns abandoned by the fleeing soldiers, and widespread prestige, for the Liberals, across the United States and Mexico as the standard bearers of the Mexican Revolution. It also led to increased surveillance and repression from the United States, and, with the influx of United States residents as volunteers, new and unforeseen issues.
Historic note:
On February 15th,1911, Colonel Celso Vega, head of the Northern Party of Baja California and commander of the region, marched on Mexicali. The Federal Column, now numbering over 200 soldiers and irregularly-conscripted citizens, came in contact with the rebels’ first defensive position, at Little’s Ranch, around 2:30pm. There, Jiménez led a small cavalry squad to meet the advancing soldiers and prevented them from surrounding the rebel defensive line. Behind them, the bulk of the PLMistas took cover in the Rio Nuevo embankment, a quarter mile from the town, digging trenches into the canal bed. They placed hats on sticks to draw enemy fire, and destroyed the only 2 bridges over the canal in the area, one with dynamite and the other with fire. The battle raged for three hours. Vega, “Habitually overconfident,...pressed forward with no attempt at concealment. Leyva’s men, entrenched along the canal banks, poured a steady fire into the Federals. In the midst of the fighting, several more Vega volunteers deserted. The coup de grâce came when the colonel, directing his troops in the open, was felled by a bullet in the neck” (Blaisdell 51). According to Bartra and Barrera, it was Jiménez himself who, in the thick of the battle, led a cavalry charge at the Federal command position and shot Vega with his pistol (Bartra and Barrera 157). Jiménez was immediately shot off his horse, and his second-in-command took a bullet to the leg. Jiménez died there, on the field in front of Mexicali, but it was not in vain. His bullet had entered Vega’s neck and shattered his jaw. Vega’s forces pulled him away from the battle on a stretcher. Decapitated, the government’s army wavered, and in short order, fled the battlefield. Vega was among 30 Federal casualties. Many of the routed soldiers ran across the border, where they were disarmed and detained by US soldiers. The severely-wounded colonel also fled to the border, fearing a rebel counterattack, but US authorities returned him, armed, to Mexico at his request when he felt the danger had passed. The Cocopah hero Jiménez was the only rebel killed. Five or six more wounded were transported across the border, where they were arrested, but had their wounds cared for. The revolutionaries also collected enough weapons from the fleeing soldiers to arm 105 additional revolutionaries. These supplies were essential as, according to Bartra and Barrera, the rebels were sorely ill-equipped: “Before the combat they had less than 100 armed men (Leyva says 45 and Turner speaks of 75), most with 30-30 and 44 carbines. Only a few had Springfield rifles from those discarded by the US Army. The diversity of weapons made the problem of ammunition shortages, etc. more serious“ (Bartra and Barrera 157).
The defense of Mexicali was an important victory that backed up the bluster of the Magónista press assault. It may have been the biggest victory of any revolutionary force in Mexico by that time. News of the route sent a stream of volunteers into Mexicali. Soon, the Baja Division had 500 volunteers. The majority were still Mexican and Indigenous fighters, but up to 100 United States residents and other International volunteers made the revolution their cause. Volunteers came from as far as Europe, Australia, and Africa. Blaisdell chides the rebels for not pressing on after the victory, writing “a desert Napoleon would have driven his men across the cold sands and up the high plateaus to Ensenada, beating the shattered enemy back to the undefended capital, in expectation of a spectacular victory. The easygoing Leyva, however,” thought they had done enough for the time. Berthold had missed the whole thing, as he was meeting with leadership in Los Angeles (Blaisdell 51).
Another outcome of this battle was that the United States government began to take the Mexicali rebels more seriously, and, perhaps due to their anarchist ideology, came to view the revolutionary project as one that could not be allowed to spread. On his trip to the north, U.S. authorities also made it known to Berthold that the border was closed to the revolutionaries, that no volunteers or weapons would be allowed to cross, and that anyone attempting to volunteer for the Baja Division would be arrested. Babcock, the commander of the local U.S. forces on the border, seen by some as too sympathetic to the Magónistas, was, at the prodding of Otis, replaced. General Bliss himself, commander of the California Military Department, arrived to take command of the US border forces (Bartra and Barrera 158). In an unprecedented move and contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States, the federal government offered safe passage for up to 200 of Vega’s forces from Yuma through United States territory, to attack Mexicali from the rear, and even considered marching US soldiers across the border to protect the riverworks. The United States Government grew to fear the PLM revolution would negatively impact the dike-building along the Colorado River east and southeast of Mexicali. Diaz’s government declined the offer without the approval of the US legislative branch, but agreed to station Mexican forces at the Colorado dike construction, asking in return for a US blockade of the border near Mexicali. While in the end, the US decided against direct military intervention to crush the anarchist rebellion--until that point, the biggest threat to Diaz regime--they did undertake a campaign to destroy the PLM Junta operating in California.
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